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Introduction
The objective of this paper is to describe key 
aspects of the recent foresight-type programmes 
in Ukraine in the broader context of innovation 
policy and then to identify the most important 
problems in foresight studies in the country. 
The paper is focused on these prospective pro-
grammes, and especially the ones launched in 
the first half of 2000s. The next two sections deal 
briefly with the recent trends in economic, S&T 
and innovation development in Ukraine, paying 
special attention to innovation policy, and to the 
role of different actors in innovation activities. 
The third section is devoted to the main features 
of the 2005–2007 Programme, and the fourth 
section presents description and some prelimi-
nary results of that last (terminated) foresight-
type programme. 
In the conclusions, we summarise the results 
and evaluate the perspectives of further develop-
ment of prospective analyses in the country in the 
context of its modernization and further integra-
tion into international structures.    
1. Situation in Economic and 
Innovation Spheres in Ukraine in 1990s – 2000s
In 1990s and 2000s, Ukraine passed through 
several periods of economic crisis, when once (in 
1998) GDP dropped even to 40% of the level the 
country had in 1989. Even in 2012 the level of GDP 
was about 70% of the level of the 1991, the last pre-
independence year. Ukraine has failed to complete 
major economic reforms, which makes it different 
from the Eastern European neighbours [1]. In the 
recent two decades, Ukrainian economy has be-
come increasingly oriented towards producing rela-
tively ‘simple’ goods for export like basic chemical 
products, the cheapest types of steel and so on. Even 
the remaining working enterprises in the machine-
building sector (for example, shipbuilding) are 
found mostly in low value added segments in tech-
nology intensive sectors. Competition in such mar-
ket segments is particularly intense, and Ukrainian 
companies are persistently under threat of losing out 
to businesses from developing countries. 
It is also necessary to note that the negative 
structural changes stemmed from the low level 
of innovation activities amongst the majority of 
Ukrainian enterprises. According to the official 
statistical data, the values for indicators concern-
ing basic innovation activities (e. g. number of new 
technologies, the number of inventions, etc.) went 
down 5–15 times between the beginning of 1990s 
and the middle 2010s [2]. The pattern of science 
and technology activities has changed gradually. 
Key efforts were not directed towards the develop-
ment and introduction of domestic technologies 
and products, but towards the adaptation of im-
ported equivalents. This has resulted not only in 
the exaggerated technological dependence of the 
country, but also to a decline in the country’s exist-
ing science and technology potential. 
Ukraine inherited a substantial part of the 
technologically oriented Soviet R&D system [3]. 
A decline in orders from the side of industry and 
collapse of the planning system led to shrinking 
of R&D establishments. The number of person-
nel involved in R&D dropped by almost two 
thirds between 1991 and 2014. Despite substantial 
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changes of the ‘economic environment’, the in-
ternal reforms within R&D system were very lim-
ited. In turn, this led to an ineffective utilization 
of funds and a low impact of the R&D sector on 
economic transformation. The dominant prin-
ciples of fund distribution on a non-competitive 
basis were preserved. Despite the declarations by 
Ukrainian authorities, less than 5% of the total 
state R&D budget was distributed on competitive 
basis in recent years. Such practice led to a widen-
ing gap between industry and science. The state 
simply did have not enough money in the budget 
to support the system of R&D organizations.  
In 1990s to 2000s science was deprived of 
prestige, and the status of scientists eroded. These 
changes resulted in gradual reduction in the num-
ber of researchers and collapse of many, if not ma-
jority, of branch (industrial) research institutes. 
Many scientists of middle age left their academic 
establishments and industry institutes. They 
swapped their activities for more profitable ones, 
while some of them emigrated. This caused a 
deepening of the age gap between different groups 
of scientists and was accompanied by the consid-
erable shortage of 30–40 years old specialists – 
the most active cohort in terms of creative capaci-
ties. The “age crisis” in science will be hanging 
over Ukraine for years to come [4]. Moreover, as 
the senior generations depart from their active in-
volvement in science, the shortage of skilled spe-
cialists will be more evident very soon. 
According to statistical surveys, the propor-
tion of innovative enterprises in the industrial sec-
tor declined from almost 30% in 1994 to 14.1% 
in 2013. There are several reasons for such chan-
ges. First of all, general deterioration of economic 
environment and technological ‘simplification’ 
contributed to a decrease of demand on innova-
tion from the side of industry. Ukrainian com-
panies supply goods with relatively low level of 
processing to the international markets (ferrous 
metallurgy, chemical industry, shipbuilding, agri-
culture) or they assemble final products from pre-
dominantly imported components for local con-
sumption (car industry, computer industry and 
some others). The second important reason for 
decline is related to the negative structural chang-
es in the Ukrainian economy, where the share of 
high and medium tech sectors shrunk threefold 
since the beginning of 1990s, while the shares of 
the energy and ferrous metallurgy sectors grew 
substantially. As previously indicated, these sec-
tors have a more stable technological base, and 
traditionally they are less innovative than high 
and medium tech sectors that contributed to the 
overall decline of the number of innovative en-
terprises. Lack of direction in modernising the 
national economy and insufficient incentives for 
developing the high tech sectors are key prob-
lems for the country. Instead, Ukraine specialises 
more and more on low-tech products, such as fer-
rous metallurgical products and basic chemicals, 
which represented around 60% of Ukrainian ex-
ports in pre-crisis period [5].
The demand for local innovative products 
dropped substantially in 1990s and the begin-
ning of 2000s, and it is far from the level that was 
reached in late 1980s. The second reason, which 
explains poor innovative performance, is related 
to the generally unfavourable business environ-
ment. The indicators of the time required for 
registration, number of permissions needed and 
the cost for the establishing a new business are 
among the worst in the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe [6]. 
There are no other established quantitative 
goals at the national level, except the target of 
1.7% of GDP to be devoted to R&D from the 
state budget. It was set in mid-1990s in the Law 
on Scientific and Technological Activities. In 
fact, this level was to have been reached several 
years ago, however, very little was done proac-
tively to achieve the target. The level of budget ex-
penditures on R&D varies from 0.33% to 0.45% 
in recent years, while the total share of R&D 
expenditures in GDP dropped to less than 0.7% 
in 2013. The share of Ukrainian publications in 
the international publications has been dropping 
year after the year, as well is the share of patents in 
UPSTO. Ukraine has very few EPO patents. This 
number is not going up. 
A system of IPR protection has been deve-
loped relatively well in recent years. The country 
has created its own patent system and the special 
Division on IPR within the Ministry for Educa-
tion and Science. In recent years this Division has 
started to operate quite effectively, although there 
is still a lot work to be done to reach the level of 
the leading EU countries. 
Technoparks are the only organisations ori-
ented towards supporting innovation develop-
ment. Even venture funds, created in the coun-
try in mid-2000s, are oriented exclusively to the 
financing of property development. As a rule, 
innovation activity is supported through direct fi-
nancing from the state budget and the system of 
the state scientific and technological programs. 
No specialized national funds, aimed at support 
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of innovation activities, have been created in the 
country. New mechanisms, such as tax incentives, 
have been implemented only temporarily in the 
case of technoparks in 1999–2004 [7].
In contrast with the innovation development 
in Eastern European countries [18], it was not co-
ordinated with other policy measures in econo-
mic sphere in Ukraine. The gap between Ukraine 
and its Western neighbours in key indicators of in-
novation activities and corresponding policy tools 
has been especially evident in 2000s, when some 
of these countries joined the EU [8; 9]. 
2. Contradictions of the State Innovation 
Policy in Ukraine
Despite a certain number of ministries, state 
agencies and advisory bodies, related to innova-
tion policy formulation and implementation, 
governance of the national innovation system 
in Ukraine is fragmented and ineffective, as the 
roles, responsibilities and financial obligations of 
the different state bodies remain ‘blurred’. The 
system as such, was the subject of permanent 
change at the executive level. Here political insta-
bility and competition to control assets and finan-
cial flows was evident.
The programmes of different ministries are 
numerous and ambitious, but their results are 
very limited due to poor financing and inadequate 
mechanisms of support of innovation projects. 
The ministries receive money on ‘current activi-
ties’ and, partially, on R&D and innovation. The 
size of innovation and R&D budgets varied for ev-
ery ministry year by year but seldom exceeds 100–
150 million UAH (up to 20–25 million Euros) 
even for the largest ministries. There was a huge 
gap between the announced intention to support 
innovation development and the real state policy, 
aimed at supporting innovation. The level of the 
actual financial support of the state innovation 
programs varied between 3% and 40% of the an-
nounced financial obligations in the years of in-
dependence [10]. At the same time, real progress 
in support of innovation activity is very limited 
due to political instability and the ineffective eco-
nomic policies of successive governments. In fact, 
instruments of support were limited to the direct 
financing through the state budget. Poor policy 
design and unfavourable business environment 
are the key reasons for failures in the innovation 
policy of the country.  
 In 1999, an attempt to create technoparks was 
made. It is important to mention that according 
to the legislative documents on technoparks; only 
innovative projects with the overheads they trans-
fer to the technopark management are exempted 
from standard taxation procedure. Companies 
cannot directly receive state support. Different 
firms have started to register their innovation 
projects within technoparks and the volume of in-
novation production reached equivalent of seven 
million Euros in 2004. However, after several 
years of relatively successful development [11], 
all privileges at technoparks were abolished in 
early 2005 by the ‘liberals’ from the new govern-
ment. An explanation for this decision was that 
the legislative acts of technoparks in early 2000s 
have opened the way for creation of ‘holes’ in 
the budget, as special conditions were created for 
some companies, which had nothing with inno-
vation, like technopark ‘Yavoriv’ near the Polish 
border. This ‘technopark’, in fact, was a terminal 
for tax free trade. However, positive effects for 
innovation development were higher, than loses, 
and the law on technoparks required changes, not 
complete abolishment. 
Mechanisms for the implementation of in-
novation policy tend to be weak because innova-
tion policy is not the focus of the state authori-
ties. Legal acts on innovation support have a lower 
priority when compared with some other state 
acts (e. g. Law on the State Budget). This opens 
the way for innovation initiatives to be blocked. 
To some extent, this is a general problem of the 
Ukrainian system of governance, although some 
positive changes in recent years are also evident. 
For instance, the country has joined almost all 
international agreements on IPR protection that 
created pre-conditions for effective technology 
transfer.   
The initiation of foresight-type programming 
was also among such positive initiatives, aimed at 
transformation of the national innovation policy. 
3. Key Features and Main Findings of the First 
Ukrainian Foresight-type Program
The government decided to supplement ex-
isting mechanisms of innovation policy by a new 
foresight-type programme in 2004. 
The program had four main tasks:
- to elaborate basic and alternative variants 
of S&T and innovation development of the coun-
try;
- to form a list of the most prospective tech-
nologies and innovations, which will create op-
portunities for opening new external markets;
- to form a list of so-called critical technolo-
gies, which will have exceptional importance for 
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the stable development of the national economy 
and for the national security;
- to prepare recommendations for the 
Ukrainian government on how to use effectively 
R&D results financed by the state, and to cre-
ate the background for the permanent system of 
foresight-type studies in the country.
The Ministry for Education and Sci-
ence (MES) of Ukraine was responsible for bud-
geting participants of the program and the general 
logistics. The National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine was responsible for the content of the 
foresight-type study. Representatives of other 
ministries were also involved in the activities of 
the working group, which organised the program. 
Participation of experts from the industrial sec-
tors was weak from the very beginning with less 
than 10% of the total number of experts. 
The process of program implementation in-
cluded several following stages: initiation of the 
Government on the foresight-type program, is-
suing of the Decree on the program start; deter-
mination of the key actors (Ministry of Educa-
tion and Science and the National Academy of 
Sciences of Ukraine and two main institutes, 
responsible for the organization of work); cre-
ation of the Scientific Council; formulation of 
the program tasks and key areas of studies by the 
Scientific Council, and distribution of functions 
between the main organizations, responsible for 
the program; preparation of information ma-
terials and consultations on formation of the 
working groups; formation of working groups 
on different disciplines and distribution of ques-
tionnaires; collection of data and evaluation 
of results (Delphi-type procedure was imple-
mented); discussion of the results (conferences, 
seminars); distribution of results (publications); 
analysis of the work, made within the Program; 
preparation of propositions on the second round 
of the program.
Scientific Council of the programme included 
around 30 prominent Ukrainian scientists and top 
state officials. Two research institutes (the Centre 
for S&T Potential and Science History Studies 
of the National Academy of Sciences – STEPS 
Centre and Institute for S&T Information from 
the MES) were nominated as the base organiza-
tions, which were responsible for the technical 
side of the program’s implementation. 
After broad consultations, fifteen thematic 
groups of scientists and other specialists were 
formed, including telecommunication, biotech-
nologies, space studies and so on.  
Every group of experts consisted of 25–40 spe-
cialists from different research institutes, univer-
sities or leading industrial companies, and, usual-
ly, from different cities of Ukraine. Special ques-
tionnaires were prepared and distributed among 
these experts in a two-stage Delphi-type proce-
dure. The representatives of the STEPS Centre 
and the working groups prepared these question-
naires jointly. After discussions and amendments 
the questionnaires were distributed among the 
members of working groups and among specialists 
from some key research institutes and companies. 
By the second stage, about 20% of the experts 
were replaced with other specialists because of the 
analysis of the initial responses. Those, who were 
substituted, could not demonstrate their qualifi-
cations in particular problems or simply ignored 
requirements of the questionnaire content or 
because of some other reasons. In late 2006, the 
third round was organized in a form of panel dis-
cussions. It provided recommendations on how 
to improve the situation with S&T and innovation 
in Ukraine. In 2007–2008, the program co-ordi-
nators disseminated the results of the Program by 
publishing its materials on the web site and during 
the conferences and seminars [12].  
Every stage of the Delphi-type process was fi-
nalised with special conferences and round tables 
of experts and some invited ‘external’ specialists, 
who discussed the key results of the programme. 
Publications on the results of the studies were 
prepared and distributed among specialists within 
the country. In principle, everyone was able to 
express his or her opinion on the key findings 
of the programme. It is worth mentioning that, 
with the assistance of the British Council, Bri-
tish specialists with experience in Foresight pro-
gram took part in methodological seminars and 
conferences, which were organized within the 
program during 2005–2006. At the same time, it 
is important to note that the procedures of expert 
group formation were not sufficiently transpar-
ent. Groups of experts were formed by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and the MES from 
limited pools of specialists. Sometimes, whole 
groups consisted predominantly of specialists 
from one research centre, while very few foreign 
experts could express their opinions on the results 
of findings. This created conditions “uniformity” 
of the final results and a reduction of the possible 
variants of development for scientific disciplines 
and technological areas. To great extent, this 
could be explained by the fact that the program 
did not receive the total amount of financial re-
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sources it was promised in 2004. This reduced the 
ability to attract more experts, and to pay more 
adequately for the job of those, who participated 
in the program. The government has not included 
money for the continuation of the program in the 
budget for 2007. This made difficult the process 
of implementation of the program, especially the 
involvement of independent experts from abroad 
and from industry. As a result, the program repre-
sented predominantly the opinion of the Ukrai-
nian research community and, partially, officials 
from different ministries.   
The analysis of the Program results, made by 
the specialists of the STEPS Centre with par-
ticipation of the representatives of the working 
groups, showed that the negative tendencies of 
the 1990s were less prominent in the 2000s. How-
ever, the general trends in changes of the main 
indicators of S&T and innovation potential de-
velopment were similar to the previous period. In 
principle, expert data confirmed the correspond-
ing statistical information on R&D and innova-
tion spheres.  
 The current level of expenditures, established 
in Ukraine, is obviously incapable of ensuring ef-
ficient research processes because the funds are 
barely sufficient for the relatively low wages and 
utility payments. Ukraine spends much less per 
researcher per year than the EU countries, in-
cluding CEE countries and less than even India 
or South Africa. Specialists, who were involved in 
foresight program, suggested that the government 
as well as the private sector should increase finan-
cial support for S&T [13]. 
As to particular research areas, traditionally, 
Ukrainian scientists had relatively strong posi-
tions in material sciences, physics, and some 
technical disciplines. Here, Ukrainian experts 
looked forward with restrained optimism. It 
seems that in some scientific areas it is still pos-
sible to expect interesting applied results, as, for 
example, in welding technologies. It is worth no-
ting that problems of energy conservation, utili-
zation of alternative sources of energy and upgra-
ding of energy generating system have received the 
highest marks for their importance [14]. Accor-
ding to Ukrainian experts, bearing in mind existing 
potential and experience, there are high chances 
that these problems will be studied and (partially) 
solved successfully in the country in the future. 
 On the other hand, the gap between Ukraine 
and the developed countries in such areas, as bio-
technology, genetics, electronics, nanotechnolo-
gies, health care methods will grow, despite that 
these research areas have received high marks for 
their importance from experts, and that Ukraini-
an scientists have promising results in some nar-
row sub-fields of these disciplines.
Interdisciplinary studies, such as physical and 
chemical biology, sensors, and environmental 
studies were mentioned as important directions 
for development. 
Traditionally, Ukrainian experts received 
high marks for space research and technologies. 
However, now and in the likely future the coun-
try cannot conduct research projects in these are-
as without intense international co-operation. 
The accent should be made on practical aspects 
of these projects, including observation of agri-
cultural lands, telecommunications and weather 
prediction. 
According to the opinion of Ukrainian ex-
perts, the Ukrainian foresight-type program 
showed that the country still has scientific poten-
tial in some disciplines.  At the same time, it is 
evident that the country’s research system con-
tinues to lag behind the international standards 
despite excellent results in some research areas. 
The most urgent objectives at the present stage of 
economic development were determined by the 
experts to be the: 
• development of R&D organisation and 
enhancing R&D management, in particular, the 
creation of new forms of integration of science 
and production sectors;
• improvement of the management skills in 
the Ukrainian research sector and the dissemina-
tion of the best practices nationwide;
• improvement of the industrial structure, 
development of hi-tech sectors and acceleration 
of socio-economic development of the regions;
• active implementation of R&D results and 
advanced technologies in different sectors of the 
national economy.
• further development of S&T co-operation 
with other countries, especially with the EU and 
neighbouring states.  
These recommendations were reflected in 
the drafts of the new laws related to innovation 
and S&T, prepared in Ukraine in 2008–2014, 
including drafts of the laws on S&T and innova-
tion policy and some others. Unfortunately, as the 
result of political instability and severe economic 
crisis, these laws were not passed by the Parlia-
ment. The program has catalysed the initiation 
of the several new innovation initiatives, which 
were announced for 2008–2011. These included 
the programme on development of innovation in-
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frastructure, and the programme on monitoring 
of innovation activities in Ukraine. However, but 
the state could not budget them in 2009–2014. 
Generally speaking, the foresight program led to 
a strategic orientation, yet its recommendations 
have not been advanced through policy processes 
and policy instruments. 
Coordinators of the program prepared several 
reports to the Ukrainian authorities, including 
the government and the Parliament [14]. These 
reports could have been used for further discus-
sions and the formulation of policy documents 
at different levels and utilized by the Ukrainian 
Parliament. As we mentioned above, according 
to existing laws, national priorities in S&T are 
determined by the Parliament every five years. 
In the past, they were formulated on the base of 
the opinion of a few experts and bearing in mind 
existing capabilities of the Ukrainian R&D or-
ganizations and the priorities in other developed 
countries. 
 In 2008, Parliament had plans to return to 
the formulation of the national priorities in the 
S&T, and this time the results of national fore-
sight could have played an important role in the 
decision-making process. Unfortunately, politi-
cal problems diverted the attention of politicians 
from the problems of S&T priorities. 
However, a positive indirect result of the pro-
gram is the preparation of the Strategy of Inno-
vation Development, which was approved during 
parliamentary hearings in July 2009. Arguments 
on the need to develop a comprehensive inno-
vation strategy and to initiate different R&D 
and innovation projects in selected areas were 
to some extent based on the results of the pro-
gram [11]. This looks logically justified, as the 
group of specialists from the National Academy 
of Sciences, which prepared the initial variant 
of the Strategy, was also involved actively in the 
foresight program. The Strategy covers a number 
of issues, including S&T priorities, organiza-
tional measures aimed at acceleration of innova-
tion development, forecasting of the main S&T 
indicators and so on. The Strategy was discussed 
widely among specialists from different minis-
tries and the University sector before the hear-
ings but, the hearings showed some differences 
in views between experts from the industrial 
ministries, academics and politicians, includ-
ing members of the Parliament. The Strategy 
has not become a law, which means that it can-
not be implemented officially yet. However, the 
Strategy has stimulated a number of discussions 
among Ukrainian experts and, probably, it could 
be used in preparation of different parliamentary 
bills and legal acts in the near future.  
4. Second Foresight-type Program 2008–2011
Only at the end of 2007, the Government ap-
proved a new foresight-type program, which had 
to be conducted between 2008 and 2011. The 
preparation of this Program started in the second 
half of 2008. According to the Law of the State 
budget, participants of the program received 
900 thousand UAH (140 thousand Euros, ac-
cording to the official exchange rate) for the peri-
od 2008–2009, or only half of the amount, which 
was announced initially [15].  This new program 
was considered a continuation of the previous 
one. Key objectives and tasks were similar. At the 
same time, it contained several new features. The 
first one is the focus on the most urgent needs 
of national development and the possibilities 
to develop and commercialize some promising 
technologies. Energy saving was the focus of the 
Programme during its first year, while the biotech 
sector and new materials were foci during the se-
cond year. Secondly, the MES of Ukraine has 
concentrated all management in its hands, al-
though this measure has not deprived specialists 
from the National Academy of Sciences from 
participation in the Program. 
 The groups of participants were changed 
substantially. The procedure of expert selection 
has become more transparent, and now every 
person with proper qualification and knowledge 
could express his (her) opinion on the specific 
problems of S&T development. Key criterion 
for selection was the level of competence of the 
specialist (experience, place of work, and publi-
cations in the area). After checking the personal 
data, experts could receive an access code from 
the MES, and fill the special questionnaire on-
line. At the same time, ministries and the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences have recommended 
different research institutes and companies for 
participation in the program. Approximately 
120 experts responded during the first year, and 
more than 200 during the second year. It is in-
teresting to note that scientists could fill part of 
the questionnaire, related to the development of 
their corresponding discipline, while industrial-
ists or representatives of the ministries focused 
on aspects, related to the commercial perspec-
tives of the products and technologies.
 More attention has been paid to interviews 
and collection of expert opinions through the In-
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ternet. However, the rate of responses appeared 
low, and coordinators had to ask different min-
istries to help them with data collection by ap-
proaching key specialists directly. As it was in the 
previous programme, the industrial sector was 
again represented very modestly (less than 20% of 
all respondents).
 The first results of the second stage of the 
programme, announced in December 2008, show 
that this initial task to detect specific technologies 
and to determine perspectives of their commer-
cialisation will be difficult to achieve. Coordina-
tors have collected data on new energy technolo-
gies from more than one hundred experts. How-
ever, this was difficult to compare or generalise. 
The list of approximately 60 different prospective 
technologies in the energy sector has been pre-
pared. Fourteen technologies were identified as 
those, which had critical importance for the fur-
ther development of the energy sector as a whole 
and for energy saving in different sectors of the 
Ukrainian economy. 
Coordinators of the program had plans to 
compile data on promising biotechnologies and 
technologies in the field of new materials in 2011. 
The corresponding list of such technologies had 
to be prepared. There were plans to attract at 
least 32 Ukrainian research institutes and groups 
to prospective studies of biotechnologies and 
35 such organizations to the studies of new ma-
terials [16]. 
The MES of Ukraine has introduced new 
computerised forms for data collection, but some 
experts of older generations could not use them 
properly. It seems that it would be important to 
arrange another round of expertise to obtain re-
levant results. The coordinators have also in-
cluded a block on ‘technology audit’ into the pro-
gram, but it is too early to conclude, how it will 
work with prospective technologies. According to 
the program administrators, a technology audit 
is an assessment of specific technologies strictly 
from a technological, not commercial, point of 
view. MES officials thought it could help to ‘filter’ 
the most promising technologies.
 Another new block in the program was the 
model of S&T development, based on a tradition-
al production function with external S&T factors. 
It is unlikely that this model could provide reliable 
results, especially in conditions of crisis. None-
theless, it is budgeted for in the working plan. 
However, the program was terminated in 2011 
along with other 28 state programs within the 
measures, aimed at balancing state budget.  
Conclusions
Although foresight is an important method-
ological instrument in deciding on goals for social 
and economic growth, it has been neglected for 
years in Ukraine. Now the urgent need for fore-
sight studies is evident for a number of scientists, 
industrialists, and officials. However, foresight-
type activity will be useless if it is not be integrated 
in the broader context of innovation policy, which 
itself needs substantial modernization and im-
provement.
First, the Ukrainian foresight activities were 
implemented in conditions of very weak and in-
coherent innovation policy. In such conditions 
Foresight faces much stronger limitations when 
compared to countries that are more institutionally 
stable and have more developed innovation policy. 
Real innovation challenges are not defined clearly 
in the official documents in Ukraine. At the same 
time, in the conditions of incoherent innovation 
policy, foresight appears to be an adequate instru-
ment to compensate some policy weaknesses. 
Second, responsibilities of the key actors were 
not well defined. There were several ministries and 
state agencies in Ukraine, which were responsible 
for support of innovation activities in the country. 
However, their scope of governance was overlap-
ping, and not clearly defined. 
Third, the foresight process itself was not 
without weaknesses. For example, the new, rela-
tively low-tech specialization of Ukrainian econ-
omy is not reflected properly in the foresight-type 
programs. More attention has to be paid to the 
technological changes in traditional sectors. In 
particular, reduction of energy consumption has 
to be among the high priorities. 
As to the first foresight-type program, in gen-
eral, this experience was not successful enough. 
However, the first foresight-type program was 
useful. It helped to collect new analytical infor-
mation and to raise important problems of inno-
vation development at least to the level of the state 
officials. While the second foresight-type program 
was more oriented on the needs of the economy, it 
was distracted from the general problems of S&T 
and innovation development.
Havas and co-authors [17] showed that the 
foresight could play at least four important func-
tions in the process of national development: as a 
sophisticated policy informing tool; as an integral 
part of policy process; as a pacemaker for building 
up reflexivity, and as a tool for impact assessment.
 In Ukraine, the foresight-type programs were 
used predominantly as a policy-informing tool, 
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while other possibilities for the utilization of the 
foresight studies were clearly underestimated. 
However, in recent years, the formulation of in-
novation policy was predominantly based not on 
the analysis of future developments in S&T and 
innovation, but on normative considerations. The 
state authorities utilized these without adequate 
analytical work. Foresight could, in principle, help 
to make decisions in these spheres more grounded 
and justified.  To be really useful for the formula-
tion and implementation of S&T and innovation 
policy, the foresight program needs changes in its 
organisation and mechanisms of co-ordination 
with other policy tools, like the state programs on 
economic and social development, branch (sec-
toral) development programmes and so on. It is 
also important to attract more specialists and go-
vernment officials into the process of foresight 
studies and to arrange a broad and open discussion 
on the most important issues of S&T development. 
This will require substantial efforts, including the 
participation of foreign experts, who could provide 
independent views on the situation in Ukrainian 
S&T and innovation spheres and propose mecha-
nisms for their further adjustment. 
Another key issue is to make the impact of re-
sults of foresight studies more effective in terms of 
their utilization in decision-making process at the 
governmental level. It is evident, that this process 
has to go along with the further democratisation 
of Ukrainian society and the embrace by politi-
cians of their responsibility to the population of 
the country.     
Foresight programs do not guarantee that 
Ukraine will successfully address a number of 
problems it faces at the moment. However, its ad-
equate implementation could help in the effective 
modernization of the national S&T and innova-
tion systems and their utilization in the interests 
of the Ukrainian society. 
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Форсайтные исследования в контексте инновационной политики 
Украины в 2000-х годах
Статья посвящена проблемам научно-технологического прогнозирования в Украине в более широком 
контексте реализации инновационной политики. Представлен обзор основных тенденций экономической, 
научно-технологической и инновационной деятельности в независимой Украине. Показаны противоречия в 
инновационной политике Украины. Выполнен подробный анализ хода реализации двух форсайтных программ 
в Украине: 2004 года  и 2008–2011 годов. Обобщены их основные результаты  и определены наиболее важные 
проблемы в области прогнозных исследований в Украине. Подчеркнуто, что форсайтные работы в Украине 
реализовывались в условиях слабой и непоследовательной инновационной политики; были нечетко определены 
задачи их участников; они в основном использовались как информационный инструмент для политиков; 
инновационная политика в Украине формировалась преимущественно на нормативной основе, а не на 
результатах анализа будущих тенденций в научно-технологической и инновационной сфере.  
Ключевые слова: форсайтная программа, исследования и разработки, инновации, технопарк.
І. Ю. Єгоров
Форсайтні дослідження в контексті інноваційної політики 
України в 2000-х роках
Стаття присвячена проблемам науково-технологічного прогнозування в Україні в більш широкому контексті 
реалізації інноваційної політики. Представлено огляд основних тенденцій економічної, науково-технологічної 
та інноваційної діяльності в незалежній Україні. Показано протиріччя інноваційної політики України. Виконано 
докладний аналіз ходу реалізації двох форсайтних програм в Україні: 2004 року  та 2008–2011 років. Узагальнено 
їхні основні результати і визначено найбільш важливі проблеми в галузі прогнозних досліджень в Україні. 
Підкреслено, що форсайтні роботи в Україні реалізовувались в умовах слабкої та непослідовної інноваційної 
політики; було нечітко визначено завдання їхніх учасників; вони здебільшого використовувались як інформаційний 
інструмент для політиків; інноваційна політика в Україні формувалась переважно на нормативній основі, а не 
на результатах аналізу майбутніх тенденцій в науково-технологічній та інноваційній сфері.
Ключові слова: форсайтна програма, дослідження та розробки, інновації, технопарк.
